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Abstract. After Mayers (1996, 2001) gave a proof of the security of the Bennett-
Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol, Shor and Preskill (2000)
made a remarkable observation that a Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) code had been
implicitly used in the BB84 protocol, and suggested its security could be proved by
bounding the fidelity, say Fn, of the incorporated CSS code of length n in the form
1 − Fn ≤ exp[−nE + o(n)] for some positive number E. This work presents such a
number E = E(R) as a function of the rate of codes R, and a threshold R0 such that
E(R) > 0 whenever R < R0, which is larger than the achievable rate based on the
Gilbert-Varshamov bound that is essentially due to Shor and Preskill (2000). The
codes in the present work are robust against fluctuations of channel parameters, which
fact is needed to establish the security rigorously and was not proved for rates above
the Gilbert-Varshamov rate before in the literature. As a byproduct, the security of a
modified BB84 protocol against any joint (coherent) attacks is proved quantitatively.
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1. Introduction
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD), the aim of which is to share a random
secret string of digits between two parties, has been said to rest on the principle of
quantum mechanics since the time of its proposal [1]. However, proofs of the security
against a reasonably wide class of attacks were obtained only recently on the first QKD
protocol, which uses Wiesner’s idea of conjugate coding [2] and is called the Bennett-
Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [1]. Since a preliminary report on such a proof of the
security of the scheme was given by Mayers [3], there have been considerable efforts
to refine, strengthen or support this result in the literature (e.g., [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]).
Especially, Shor and Preskill [6] (see also [7, Section III]) made a remarkable observation
that a Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) quantum code had been implicitly used in the
BB84 protocol, and suggested if the fidelity, say Fn, of the incorporated Calderbank-
Shor-Steane code [10, 11] goes to unity exponentially as the code-length n grows large,
viz., 1 − Fn ≤ exp[−nE + o(n)] for some positive number E, then the security of the
BB84 protocol will be ensured in the sense that the mutual information between the
shared key and the data obtained by the eavesdropper is less than exp[−nE + o(n)].
However, no one seems to have given such an exponent E for CSS codes explicitly in the
literature. Thus, this paper is concerned with the problem of finding such an exponent
E(R) as an explicit function of the rate R of CSS codes.
The proviso for the security proof in this paper is as follows: In the main text, we
assume that the possible eavesdropper tries to obtain data by performing an identical
measurement on each ‘particle’ (what is really meant is the d-level quantum system
carrying a digit from {0, . . . , d − 1}, which is typically assumed to be the polarization
of a photon, a two-level system); the two legitimate participants of the protocol can
communicate with each other by means of a classical noiseless ‘public channel’ that may
be susceptible to passive eavesdropping but is free of tampering; we adopt the formalism
developed by Kraus and others to describe measurements (e.g., [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]).
We assume the so-called individual-attack assumption as mentioned above in order to
discuss trade-offs between the level of attacks (including noises) and the allowed rates of
transmission of the key; without such an assumption, the level of attacks (often called
error rates) could not be properly defined for this purpose. After this tractable case
is worked out, the security of a modified BB84 protocol against any joint (coherent)
attacks is proved quantitatively in Appendix C.
Among others, it is proved that a code of ‘balanced weight spectrum’, i.e., a code
whose weight distribution is almost proportional to the binomial coefficients (when
d = 2) attains the desired fidelity bound. This would show the direction to designers of
codes for QKD. The code is robust against fluctuations of channel parameters, which
is needed to complete the proof of the security rigorously for rates beyond the Gilbert-
Varshamov one even in the case of individual attacks. The channel parameters have to
be estimated by the participants of the BB84 to assess the level of eavesdropping, and
the robustness is necessary because the estimated channel parameters are not exactly
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equal to the true ones in general. The robustness issue will be resolved by utilizing the
idea of universal codes [17, 18] in information theory. A universal code means one whose
structure does not depend on the channel characteristics.
The CSS codes form a class of symplectic (stabilizer or additive) codes [19, 20, 21],
and there exists a simple class of CSS codes, in which a CSS code is specified by a
classical code, say C ′, satisfying some condition on orthogonality. If we are content
with correcting the errors of Hamming weight up to δn/2, where δn is the minimum
distance of C ′, exponential convergence of fidelity immediately follows from the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound for CSS codes [10] and Sanov’s theorem (Section 7), which is central
in large deviation theory [22, 23]. Nevertheless, this argument only ensures the security
of the BB48 protocol of code rate up to 1− 2h(δX + δZ), where h is the base-two binary
entropy function, δZ is the raw bit error rate in transmitting a bit encoded into an
eigenvector |0〉 or |1〉 of a Pauli operator, say, Z, and δX is that with a bit encoded
into |0〉± |1〉. Note that the argument of Shor and Preskill [6] can easily be modified to
establish the rate 1−2h(δX+δZ) for individual attacks (Section 7). The aim of this paper
includes to obtain, in a rigorous manner, the better achievable rate 1−2h((δX + δZ)/2).
This rate seems essentially the same as the one previously mentioned in the literature [6],
[7, Eq. (38)], though these papers focused on other issues and gave no details on their
codes achieving this higher rate.
We remark that in comparing this paper’s bound with the previously claimed ones,
we should care about the meaning of ‘error rates’. Namely, strictly speaking, we should
distinguish the error rates in this paper from the ‘error rates’ in security proofs for joint
attacks. Specifically, our δX and δZ are parameters of the channel that represents the
eavesdropper’s attack on each digit whereas it is natural to define the ‘error rates’ for
joint attacks as some fictional random variables which are associated with the much
larger channel that represents a general joint attack; In Appendix C of this paper, the
‘error rates’ for joint attacks will appear as Pξ′(1) and Pζ′(1), where Pξ′ [Pζ ′] is the
type, i.e., the empirical distribution of the ‘sifted’ part, or an even smaller part, ξ′ [ζ ′]
of the sequence of random variables ξ [ζ].
Results on exponential convergence of the fidelity of quantum codes (quantum error-
correcting codes) have already been obtained by the present author with random coding,
which is a proof technique of Shannon’s, over general symplectic codes [24, 25, 26]. These
previous results, however, ensure only the existence of reliable symplectic codes, and use
of symplectic codes other than CSS codes in QKD seems to require a quantum computer
to implement [6]. Thus, this paper will provide a rigorous but elementary proof that
the fidelity Fn of some CSS codes of rate R satisfies 1 − Fn ≤ exp[−nE(R) + o(n)] for
some function E(R) such that E(R) > 0 whenever R < 1− 2h((δX + δZ)/2).
Using this bound and Schumacher’s argument [28], which related channel codes
with quantum cryptography, we prove the security of the BB84 protocol. The proof
to be presented below is basically a refinement of Shor and Preskill’s. Whereas use
of two-level systems is often assumed when symplectic codes or the BB84 protocol are
discussed in the literature, most notions and results easily extend to d-level systems
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with an arbitrary prime d. Moreover, maybe contrary to one’s expectation, our analysis
in the case where d ≥ 3 will turn out to be more tractable than in the case where d = 2
except for the part treating channel estimation, so that we will begin with the easier
case where d ≥ 3.
We neither touch on more practical issues such as the one on difficulty in preparing
a single photon or how to implement d-level systems, nor treat more elaborated models
allowing basis-dependent attacks and so on [8].
We remark that there has already been a proposal to use two-way entanglement
distillation protocols for QKD in order to increase the maximum tolerable error rate [29],
whereas the security of the BB84 protocol to be treated in this paper relies on simpler
quantum error-correcting (CSS) codes, which can be viewed as one-way entanglement
distillation protocols. The former class is still based on CSS codes, and would deserve
further investigations. However, we will stay around the simple class of protocols in this
paper in order to resolve the issues mentioned above.
Attainable fidelity of codes given in this paper may also be interesting from a
viewpoint of quantum computing since CSS codes are well-suited for fault-tolerant
quantum computing [30, 31]. Incidentally, the technique (permutation argument) in the
existence proof of CSS codes in this paper can be incorporated into those of [24, 25, 26]
to show that the fidelity bounds of [24, 25, 26] can be attained by robust symplectic
codes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the needed notation on CSS codes
is fixed and a brief review on this class of codes is given. In Section 3, we establish
the exponential convergence of the fidelity of CSS codes. In Section 4, we apply
Schumacher’s argument to CSS codes to interpret a quantum code as a QKD protocol,
and describe how this reduces to the BB84 protocol. Section 5 reviews the method for
channel parameter estimation in the BB84 protocol. In Section 6, the security proof is
completed. Sections 7 and 8 contain discussions and the conclusion, respectively. Proofs
of subsidiary results are given in Appendix A. In Appendix B, an even better achievable
rate, 1 − h(δX)− h(δZ), in the BB84 protocol is given. A proof of security of a simple
BB84-type protocol for joint attacks is given in Appendix C. The case of general joint
attacks is treated in Appendix C. A nomenclature can be found in Appendix D.
2. Calderbank-Shor-Steane Codes
The complex linear space of operators on a Hilbert space H is denoted by L(H). A
quantum code usually means a pair (Q,R) consisting of a subspace Q of H⊗n and a
trace-preserving completely positive (TPCP) linear map R on L(H⊗n), called a recovery
operator; the subspace Q alone is also called a (quantum) code. Symplectic codes have
more structure: They are simultaneous eigenspaces of commuting operators on H⊗n.
Once a set of commuting operators is specified, we have a collection of eigenspaces of
them. A symplectic code refers to either such an eigenspace or a collection of eigenspaces,
each possibly accompanied by a suitable recovery operator. Hereafter, we assume H is
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a Hilbert space with an orthonormal basis {|i〉}i=d−1i=0 , and d is a prime. Throughout, Fd
denotes Z/dZ, a finite field. We use the dot product defined by
(x1, . . . , xn) · (y1, . . . , yn) =
n∑
i=1
xiyi (1)
where the arithmetic is performed in Fd (i.e., modulo d ), and let C
⊥ denote {y ∈ Fnd |
∀x ∈ C, x · y = 0} for a subset C of Fnd .
In constructing symplectic codes, the following basis of L(H⊗n) is used. Let unitary
operators X,Z on H be defined by
X|j〉 = |j − 1〉, Z|j〉 = ωj|j〉, j ∈ Fd (2)
with ω being a primitive d-th root of unity (e.g., ei2pi/d). For u = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Fnd , let
Xu and Zu denote Xu1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xun and Zu1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Zun, respectively. The operators
XuZw, u, w ∈ Fnd , form a basis of L(H⊗n), which we call the Weyl (unitary) basis [32].
Observe the commutation relation
(XuZw)(Xu
′
Zw
′
) = ωu·w
′−w·u′(Xu
′
Zw
′
)(XuZw), u, w, u′, w′ ∈ Fnd , (3)
which follows from XZ = ωZX . It is sometimes useful to rearrange the components
of (u, w) appearing in the operators XuZw in the Weyl basis as follows: For
u = (u1, . . . , un) and w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Fnd , we denote the rearranged one
((u1, w1), . . . , (un, wn)) ∈ X n, where X = Fd × Fd, by [u, w]. We occasionally use
another symbol N for the Weyl basis: N[u,w] = X
uZw and NJ = {Nx | x ∈ J} for
J ∈ X n.
A CSS code is specified by a pair of classical linear codes (i.e., subspaces of Fnd)
such that one contains the other. The quantum codes to be proved to have the desired
performance in the sequel are CSS codes of a special type, for which the pair is a classical
code C and its dual C⊥ with the property
C ⊆ C⊥.
This condition is equivalent to ∀x, y ∈ C, x · y = 0, and a code C satisfying it is said to
be self-orthogonal (with respect to the dot product).
Coset structures are exploited in construction of CSS codes. We fix some transversal
(set of coset representatives in which each coset has exactly one representative) of the
quotient group Fnd/C
⊥. Identifying Fnd/C
⊥ and C⊥/C with their fixed transversals,
respectively, we sometimes write, say, x ∈ Fnd/C⊥ and v ∈ C⊥/C for coset
representatives x and v.
Put κ = dimC, and assume g1, . . . , gκ form a basis of C. The operators
Zg1, . . . , Zgκ, Xg1, . . . , Xgκ, (4)
commute with each other by (3) and C ⊆ C⊥, so that we have a collection of
simultaneous eigenspaces of these operators, which is called a CSS code. Specifically,
put
|φxzv〉 = 1√|C|∑
w∈C
ωz·w|w + v + x〉 (5)
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for coset representatives x, z ∈ Fnd/C⊥ and v ∈ C⊥/C. Then, we have
Zgj |φxzv〉 = ωx·gj |φxzv〉 and Xgj |φxzv〉 = ωz·gj |φxzv〉, j = 1, . . . , κ. (6)
It is easy to check that |φxzv〉, x, z ∈ Fnd/C⊥, v ∈ C⊥/C, form an orthonormal basis of
H⊗n. In words, we have dn−2κ-dimensional subspaces Qxz such that
⊕
x,zQxz = H⊗n
and Qxz is spanned by orthonormal vectors |φxzv〉, v ∈ C⊥/C, for each pair (x, z) ∈
(Fnd/C
⊥)2. The subspaces Qxz, (x, z) ∈ (Fnd/C⊥)2, are the simultaneous eigenspaces of
the operators in (4), and form a CSS code.
We will consistently use κ and k to denote κ = dimFd C and
k = n− 2κ = logd dimCQxz. (7)
Decoding or recovery operation for this type of CSS quantum codes is simple. If we
choose a transversal Γ of Fnd/C
⊥, we can construct a recovery operator R for Qxz so
that the code (Qxz,R) is NJ(Γ)-correcting in the sense of [33], where
J(Γ) = {[x, z] | x ∈ Γ and z ∈ Γ}. (8)
This directly follows from the general theory of symplectic codes [19, 20, 21, 26] on
noticing that the operators in the Weyl basis that commute with all of those in (4) are
XuZw, u ∈ C⊥, w ∈ C⊥, due to (3). The NJ(Γ)-correcting CSS code specified by C and
Γ as above will be denoted by CSS(C,Γ).
3. Exponential Convergence of Fidelity of Codes to Unity
First, we treat the simple problem of establishing an attainable fidelity of CSS codes.
We write P n((x1, . . . , xn)) for P (x1) · · ·P (xn) and P n(J) for
∑
x∈J P
n(x), where P is
a probability distribution on X and J ⊆ X n. More generally, PQ denotes the usual
product of two probability distributions P and Q, which is specified by [PQ](s, t) =
P (s)Q(t). For a probability distribution Q on Y × Y , we denote the two marginal
distributions by Q and Q:
Q(s) =
∑
t∈Y
Q(s, t), Q(s) =
∑
t∈Y
Q(t, s), s ∈ Y .
3.1. The case where d ≥ 3
The fidelity of the NJ(Γ)-correcting quantum code CSS(C,Γ) is not smaller than
P n(J(Γ)) when it is used on the quantum channel that maps ρ ∈ L(H⊗n) to∑
x∈Xn P
n(x)NxρN
†
x. This is true whether entanglement fidelity [28] or minimum
fidelity [33] is employed. This bound applies to general channels as well (Section 5).
Then, noticing
P n(J(Γ)c) ≤ P n(Γc) + P n(Γc), (9)
where Jc denotes the complement of J , which holds by the definition (8) of J(Γ), we
will prove the following theorem.
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Theorem 1 Assume d ≥ 3. Let a number 0 ≤ R ≤ 1 be given. There exists a
sequence of pairs {(Cn,Γn)}, each consisting of a self-orthogonal code Cn ⊆ Fnd with
n− 2 dimFd Cn ≥ nR and a set Γn of coset representatives of Fnd/C⊥n , such that for any
probability distribution P on X = Fd × Fd,
P n(J(Γn)
c) ≤ P n(Γcn) + P
n
(Γcn) ≤ d−nE(R,P ,P )+o(n)
where
E(R,P , P ) = min{E∗(R,P ), E∗(R,P )},
E∗(R, p) = min
Q
[D(Q||p) + 2−1|1− 2H(Q)− R|+],
|t|+ = max{t, 0}, H and D denote the entropy and the Kullback-Leibler information
with logarithms of base d, respectively, and the minimization with respect to Q is taken
over all probability distributions on Fd.
Remark 1. The function E(R,P , P ) is strictly positive for R < 1 −
2max{H(P ), H(P )}. The code CSS(Cn,Γn) has rate 1 − 2 dimFd Cn/n ≥ R. The
code C⊥n , as a classical channel code of rate not less than R
′ = (R + 1)/2, attains the
error exponent E∗(2R′ − 1, p) known as the random coding error exponent [17] of the
memoryless additive channel that changes an input a ∈ Fd into a − b with probability
p(b).
Remark 2. Whereas P n(J(Γn)) is a measure of the performance of quantum code
CSS(Cn,Γn), the probability P
n
(Γcn) has its own meaning. It is an upper bound on the
probability of decoding error for the key transmission, which is proved in Appendix A.
In fact, the error probability is P
n
(Γ′cn ) where Γ
′
n = Γn+Cn, not P
n
(Γcn) because adding
a word e in Cn to the key v + Cn does not change it.
Remark 3. That Γ′n is the effective correctable errors in QKD (Remark 2) may
be interpreted as a manifestation of an inherent property, which is sometimes called
‘degeneracy’, of CSS codes (more generally, of symplectic codes): Put Γ′ = Γ+C; Then,
a CSS code CSS(C,Γ), as a quantum code, can correct the ‘errors’ Ny, y ∈ J(Γ′) [19, 20]
(or e.g., [26, 27]).
Remark 4. The function o(n) is explicitly given as 3(d− 1) logd(n+ 1) + logd 2 + d
by (18) below.
We prove the theorem by a random coding argument, which is analogous to that in
[24], where the idea of universal decoding, i.e., minimum entropy (maximum mutual
information) decoding of Goppa (e.g., [17, 18]) was already used. For the present
purposes, we want the codes Cn also to be robust or universal in the sense that their
structures do not depend on the distribution P , which characterizes the channel. To
show this, we begin with the next lemma, which is a variant of Calderbank and Shor’s [10,
Section V] and says that the ensemble of all self-orthogonal codes is ‘balanced’.
Lemma 1 Assume d ≥ 3, and let
A = A(n,κ) = {C ⊆ Fnd | C linear, C ⊆ C⊥, dimC = κ}
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and
Ax = {C ∈ A | x ∈ C⊥}.
Then, for any u ∈ Fd, there exists a constant Tu such that |Ax| = Tu for any non-zero
word x ∈ Fnd with x · x = u.
Remark. The proof below is the same as that of Lemma 6 in [25] except that the dot
product is used here in place of the standard symplectic form. This is possible because
F
n
d equipped with the dot product is an orthogonal space if d is a prime other than 2.
The case of d = 2 is exceptional, and will be treated later. Lemma 1 and the corollary
below are true if the dot product is replaced by any orthogonal, symplectic or unitary
form more generally.
Proof. To prove |Ax| = |Ay| for non-zero vectors x and y with x · x = y · y = u,
it is enough to show the existence of an isometry α (an invertible linear map α that
preserves the ‘product’, i.e., that satisfies α(x) · α(y) = x · y for all x and y) on Fnd with
y = α(x), but this directly follows from the well-known Witt lemma [34, 35, 36, 37],
which states that any isometry that is defined on a subspace of an orthogonal space V
can be extended to an isometry on the whole space V . 
Corollary 1 For x ∈ Fnd , d ≥ 3,
|Ax|
|A| ≤
{
d−κ+d−1 if x 6= 0n
1 if x = 0n.
Proof. The case of x = 0n is trivial. Let Su = |{x ∈ Fnd | x · x = u, x 6= 0n}| for
u ∈ Fd. Counting the pairs (x, C) such that x ∈ C⊥, x · x = u, x 6= 0n and C ∈ A in
two ways, we have SuTu ≤ |A|(dn−κ − 1). But Su ≥ dn−d+1 − 1 (since x ∈ Su can take
arbitrary values in the first n− d+ 1 positions except (0, 0, . . . , 0)), and hence we have
(dn−d+1 − 1)Tu ≤ |A|(dn−κ − 1), from which the desired estimate follows. 
In the proof of Theorem 1, we will use the method of types, a standard tool in
information theory. Here we collect the needed notions and basic inequalities regarding
the method of types. With a finite set Y fixed, the set of all probability distributions
on Y is denoted by P(Y). The type of a sequence y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Yn, denoted by Py,
represents the relative frequencies of appearances of symbols s ∈ Y in y:
Py(s) =
|{i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, yi = s}|
n
, s ∈ Y . (10)
The set of all possible types of sequences in Yn is denoted by Pn(Y), and for Q ∈ Pn(Y),
the set of sequences of type Q and length n is denoted by T nQ or T nQ (Y). In what follows,
we use
|Pn(Y)| ≤ (n+ 1)d−1, and ∀Q ∈ Pn(Y), |T nQ | ≤ dnH(Q), (11)
where d = |Y|. Note that if x ∈ Yn has type Q, then pn(x) = ∏s∈Y p(s)nQ(s) =
d−n[H(Q)+D(Q||p)] for any p ∈ P(Y), so that the probability that words of a fixed type
Q ∈ Pn(Y) occur has the bound∑
y∈Yn:Py=Q
pn(x) ≤ d−nD(Q||p). (12)
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Now we are ready to prove the existence of a ‘balanced’ code, which will turn out
to be universal. Given a set C ′ ⊆ Fnd , put
MQ(C
′) = |{x ∈ C ′ | Px = Q}|
=
∑
x∈Fnd
1[x ∈ C ′ and Px = Q], Q ∈ Pn(Fd),
where 1[T ] equals 1 if the statement T is true and equals 0 otherwise, and put
MQ =
1
|A|
∑
C∈A
MQ(C
⊥).
Then, we obtain the next lemma following the method in [38] (cf. [39]).
Lemma 2 For any n ≥ 2 and κ ≤ n/2, there exists a code C in A = A(n,κ) such that
∀Q ∈ Pn(Fd), MQ(C⊥) ≤ |Pn(Fd)|MQ.
Remark. The list of numbers (MQ(C
′))Q∈Pn(Fd), type spectrum, so to speak, is a natural
generalization of the weight spectrum (distribution) in coding theory. In fact, they are
the same when d = 2.
Proof: Regarding C as a random variable uniformly distributed over A and using
Markov’s inequality (e.g., [23]), which states that Pr{X ≥ aµ} ≤ 1/a for a positive
constant a, and a random variable X that takes non-negative values and has a positive
mean µ, we have
Pr{∃Q ∈ Pn(Fd), MQ(C⊥) ≥ |Pn(Fd)|1+εMQ and MQ > 0}
≤
∑
Q∈Pn(Fd):MQ>0
Pr{MQ(C⊥) ≥ |Pn(Fd)|1+εMQ} ≤ 1/|Pn(Fd)|ε
for any ε > 0. Hence, Pr{∀Q ∈ Pn(Fd), MQ(C⊥) < |Pn(Fd)|1+εMQ or MQ = 0} ≥
1− 1/|Pn(Fd)|ε > 0. Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, this implies the lemma. 
Corollary 2 There exists a code C in A = A(n,κ) such that for any Q ∈ Pn(Fd),
Q 6= P0n,
MQ(C
⊥)
|T nQ |
≤ |Pn(Fd)|d−κ+d−1.
Proof: We have
MQ =
1
|A|
∑
C∈A
∑
x∈Fnd
1[x ∈ C⊥ and Px = Q]
=
∑
x∈Fnd :Px=Q
1
|A|
∑
C∈A
1[x ∈ C⊥]
≤
∑
x∈Fnd :Px=Q
d−κ+d−1
= |T nQ |d−κ+d−1, Q 6= P0n , (13)
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where the inequality is due to Corollary 1, and hence the desired estimate. 
Corollary 2 says that there exists a code C ∈ A such that (MQ(C⊥))Q∈Pn(Fd) is
almost proportional to (MQ(F
n
d))Q∈Pn(Fd) = (|T nQ |)Q∈Pn(Fd). [Clearly, the code C⊥ in this
corollary satisfies the Gilbert-Varshamov bound asymptotically.] We will see that the
code in Lemma 2 or Corollary 2 has the universality mentioned above.
The decoding should also possess such universality. Note that for CSS codes, in
theory, the design of a decoder is accomplished by choosing a transversal of Fnd/C
⊥.
Based on the idea of minimum entropy decoding, from each of the dκ cosets of C⊥ in
F
n
d , we choose a vector that minimizes H(Px) in the coset. To break ties, we use an
arbitrarily fixed order, say a lexicographic order in Fnd .
Proof of Theorem 1. In the proof, Pn(Fd) is abbreviated as Pn. Fix a code C of
the property in Corollary 2 and a transversal Γ chosen as above. We will show C is
the desired code. Let Sn be the group composed of all permutations on {1, . . . , n}
and assume pi ∈ Sn, when applied to C or Γ, permutes all words in C or Γ as
pi([x1, . . . , xn]) = [xpi(1), . . . , xpi(n)]. Clearly, p
n(pi(Γ)) = pn(Γ) for any pi ∈ Sn and any
probability distribution p on Fd. For a technical reason, we will evaluate the ensemble
average of pn(pi(Γ)) over Sn, which equals pn(Γ), the original quantity in question.
Specifically, put
B(p) =
1
|Sn|
∑
pi∈Sn
pn(pi(Γ)c) (14)
for p = P , P . We will show, for some polynomial f(n), that B(p) is bounded above
by f(n)d−nE
∗(R,p), which implies B(P ) + B(P ) ≤ 2f(n)d−nmin{E∗(R,P ),E∗(R,P )}. This,
together with (9), establishes the theorem.
It was shown that an exponential fidelity bound holds for a ‘balanced’ ensemble
of additive codes [24, 25]. To take the same approach as in [24, 25], we show that the
ensemble pi(C)⊥, pi ∈ Sn, is almost ‘balanced’. Imagine we list up all words in pi(C)⊥
for all pi ∈ Sn. Clearly, for any Q ∈ Pn, there exists a constant, say LQ, such that
|{pi ∈ Sn | x ∈ pi(C)⊥}| = LQ for any word x with Px = Q. Then, counting the number
of words of a fixed type Q in the list in two ways, we have |T nQ |LQ = |Sn|MQ(C⊥).
Hence, for any type Q 6= P0n ,
LQ
|Sn| =
MQ(C
⊥)
|T nQ |
≤ |Pn|d−κ+d−1, (15)
where we have used Corollary 2. We have proved the next lemma.
Lemma 3 Put
Ay(C) = {pi ∈ Sn | y ∈ pi(C)⊥}.
For y ∈ Fnd , y 6= 0n, we have
|Ay(C)|
|Sn| ≤ |Pn|d
−κ+d−1.
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From (14), we have
B(p) =
1
|Sn|
∑
pi∈Sn
∑
x/∈pi(Γ)
pn(x)
=
∑
x∈Fnd
pn(x)
|{pi ∈ Sn | x /∈ pi(Γ)}|
|Sn| . (16)
Since x /∈ pi(Γ) occurs only if there exists a word u ∈ Fnd such that H(Pu) ≤ H(Px) and
u−x ∈ pi(C)⊥ \{0n} from the design of Γ specified above (minimum entropy decoding),
it follows
|{pi ∈ Sn | x /∈ pi(Γ)}|/|Sn|
≤
∑
u∈Fnd :H(Pu)≤H(Px), u 6=x
|Au−x(C)|/|Sn|
≤
∑
u∈Fnd :H(Pu)≤H(Px)
|Pn|d−(κ−d+1),
=
∑
Q′∈Pn:H(Q′)≤H(Px)
|Pn||T nQ′|d−(κ−d+1)
≤
∑
Q′∈Pn:H(Q′)≤H(Px)
|Pn|dnH(Q′)−(κ−d+1) (17)
where we have used Lemma 3 for the second inequality, and (11) for the last inequality.
Then, recalling (7) and (12), and choosing the smallest integer k such that k ≥ nR and
κ = (n − k)/2 is an integer, which implies nR ≤ k < nR + 2, with repeated use of the
inequality min{s + t, 1} ≤ min{s, 1}+min{t, 1} for s, t ≥ 0, we can proceed from (16)
as follows:
B(p) ≤
∑
x∈Fnd
pn(x)min
{ ∑
Q′∈Pn:H(Q′)≤H(Px)
|Pn|dnH(Q′)−(κ−d+1), 1
}
≤ |Pn|
∑
Q∈Pn
d−nD(Q||p)+dmin
{ ∑
Q′∈Pn:H(Q′)≤H(Q)
dnH(Q
′)−n−k
2
−1, 1
}
≤ |Pn|
∑
Q∈Pn
d−nD(Q||p)+d
∑
Q′∈Pn:H(Q′)≤H(Q)
min{d−n[1−R−2H(Q′)]/2, 1 }
≤ |Pn|2
∑
Q∈Pn
d−nD(Q||p)+d max
Q′∈P(Fd):H(Q′)≤H(Q)
d−n|1−R−2H(Q
′)|+/2
= |Pn|2
∑
Q∈Pn
d−nD(Q||p)+dd−n|1−R−2H(Q)|
+/2
≤ dd|Pn|3max
Q
d−n[D(Q||p)+|1−R−2H(Q)|
+/2] = dd|Pn|3d−nE∗(R,p).
Hence, we have
B(P ) +B(P ) =
1
|Sn|
∑
pi∈Sn
[P
n
(pi(Γ)c) + P
n
(pi(Γ)c)]
≤ 2dd|Pn|3d−nmin{E∗(R,P ),E∗(R,P )}. (18)
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Since |Pn| ≤ (n+ 1)d−1, we obtain the desired bound. 
3.2. The case where d = 2
Calderbank and Shor [10] proved the following lemma based on a result in coding theory.
Lemma 4 Assume d = 2, n ≥ 2 is an even integer, and 0 < κ ≤ n/2 is an integer. Let
A = {C ⊆ Fnd | C linear, {1n} ⊆ C ⊆ C⊥, dimC = κ},
and
Ax = {C ∈ A | x ∈ C⊥}.
Then, there exists a constant T0 satisfying |Ax| = T0 for any x ∈ Fnd with x · x = 0,
x 6= 0n and x 6= 1n.
Corollary 3 For x ∈ Fn2 ,
|Ax|
|A| ≤
{
d−κ+d−1 if x 6= 0n and x 6= 1n
1 if x = 0n or x = 1n.
Remark. Trivially, |Ax| = 0 for all x with x · x = 1 since x · x = x · 1n. We can also
prove this lemma noticing a hidden structure of a symplectic space. Namely, letting
Feven be the set of of all words x with x · x = 0 in Fn2 , and noting that the additive
quotient group Feven/span 1
n, where span 1n = {0n, 1n}, is a symplectic space equipped
with the natural form (x+ span 1n) · (y + span 1n) = x · y, we can argue as in the proof
of Lemma 1.
In Theorem 1, due to Remark 3 thereof, we could have used Γ′ or a subset Γ˜ of Γ′ in
place of Γ for the purposes of evaluating the fidelity (and the probability of disagreement
between Alice’s key and Bob’s due to Remark 2 to Theorem 1). Namely, we obtain
Theorem 1 with ‘d ≥ 3’ and ‘P n(J(Γn)c) ≤ P n(Γcn) + P
n
(Γcn)’ replaced by ‘d = 2 and
n is even’ and ‘P n(J(Γ˜n)
c) ≤ P n(Γ˜cn) + P
n
(Γ˜cn)’, respectively, where Γ˜n = Γn + 1
n, and
using Corollary 3 instead of Corollary 1 in the above proof of Theorem 1. In fact, with
Γ replaced by Γ˜, the proof of Theorem 1 can read verbatim except the first inequality
in (17), which should be replaced by
|{pi ∈ Sn | x /∈ pi(Γ˜)}| ≤
∑
u∈Fnd :H(Pu)≤H(Px), u−x 6=0
n,1n
|Au−x(C)|,
and the other few words. Thus, the statement of Theorem 1 is true for d = 2 with
Γ replaced by Γ˜ and with the restriction of n being even, where the code Cn always
contains 1n. [For d = 2 and n odd, a geometric argument based on isometries as before
shows that the rate 1−2h((δX+ δZ)/2) is achievable for (δX+ δZ)/2 ≤ 1/2, whereas the
restriction (δX + δZ)/2 ≤ 1/2 is not needed for n even. In this case, we use isometries
on Fnd that fix 1
n, with respect to the dot product, noticing that Fnd = Feven + span 1
n
and 1n is orthogonal to Feven in order to prove the existence of balanced codes; we use
the minimum Hamming distance decoding in place of the minimum entropy decoding.]
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4. Bennett-Brassard 1984 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
In the proof of the security of the BB84 protocol, Shor and Preskill used the
observation of Lo and Chau [40], who upper-bounded the amount of information that
the eavesdropper, Eve, could obtain on the key by the Holevo bound [41]. However, a
similar observation using the Holevo bound had already been made by Schumacher [28,
Section V-C], who directly related Eve’s information with quantum channel codes. In
this section, we will apply Schumacher’s argument to CSS codes to avoid a detour to
entanglement distillation.
4.1. Quantum Codes and Quantum Cryptography
Suppose we send a k-digit key V + C ∈ C⊥/C encoded into |φXZV〉 ∈ QXZ, where
we regard X,Z,V as random variables, and (X,Z,V) are randomly chosen according to
the uniform distribution. Once Eve has done an eavesdropping, namely, a series of
measurements, Eve’s measurement results form another random variable, say, E. We
use the standard symbol I to denote the mutual information (Appendix D).
According to [28, Section V-C],
I(V;E|X = x,Z = z) ≤ Sxz (19)
where Sxz is the entropy exchange after the system suffers a channel noise N , Eve’s
attack E , another channel noise N ′, and the recovery operation R = Rxz for Qxz at
the receiver’s end. Let us denote by Fxz the fidelity of the code (Qxz,R) employing the
entanglement fidelity Fe [28]. Specifically,
Fxz = Fe(piQxz ,RN ′EN )
where piQ denotes the normalized projection operator onto Q, and BA(ρ) = B(A(ρ))
for two CP maps A and B, etc. Then, by the quantum Fano inequality [28, Section VI],
we have
Sxz ≤ h(Fxz) + (1− Fxz)2nR (20)
where R = n−1 logd dimQxz. Combining (19) and (20) and taking the averages of the
end sides, we obtain
I(V;E|XZ) ≤ Eh(FXZ) + (1− EFXZ)2nR
≤ h(EFXZ) + (1− EFXZ)2nR, (21)
where E denotes the expectation operator with respect to (X,Z). Hence, if 1 − EFXZ
goes to zero faster than 1/n, then I(V;E|XZ) → 0 as n → ∞. We have seen that the
convergence is, in fact, exponential for some good CSS codes, viz., 1−EFXZ ≤ d−nE+o(n)
with some E > 0. This, together with (21), implies
I(V;E|XZ) ≤ 2d−nE+o(n)[n(E +R)− o(n)], (22)
where we used the upper bound −2t log t for h(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ 1/2, which can easily be
shown by differentiating t log t (or by Lemma 2.7 of [17]). Thus, we could safely send a
Reliability of CSS Codes and Security of Quantum Key Distribution 14
key v + C provided we could send the entangled state |φxzv〉 in (5) and the noise level
of the quantum channel including Eve’s action were tolerable by the quantum code.
4.2. Reduction to the Bennett-Brassard 1984 Protocol
To reduce the above protocol to a more practical one, namely the BB84 protocol, we use
Shor and Preskill’s observation that the probabilistic mixture of |φxzv〉 with x, v fixed
and z chosen uniformly randomly over Fnd/C
⊥ is given as
1
|C|
∑
z
|φxzv〉〈φxzv| = 1|C|
∑
w∈C
|w + v + x〉〈w + v + x|, (23)
which can be prepared as the mixture of states |w+v+x〉 with no entanglement. Then,
it is seen that sending the key v encoded into the state in (23) with x chosen randomly
is exactly what is done in the following protocol of Bennett and Brassard, which is
essentially the same as that in [6] except that a CSS code of a higher rate is chosen in
Step (vii).
In the protocol, introduced are three more sequences of independent and identically
distributed binary random variables a, b, c, where a = (a1, . . . , am) and so on. The
probability of occurrence of 1 for the bits of a, b, c will be denoted by pa, pb, pc,
respectively, where pa, pb, pc ∈ (0, 1). We put
r =
papb
papb + (1− pa)(1− pb) , (24)
which is the expected ratio of the number of i’s with ai = bi = 1 to that of i’s with ai = bi.
In what follows, the Z-basis denotes the collection |j〉, j ∈ Fd, the Z-basis measurement
denotes the simple (projective) measurement {|j〉〈j|}j. We also say ‘measure Z’ in
place of ‘perform the Z-basis measurement’. The X-basis, X-basis measurement, and
‘measure X ’ are to be similarly understood with the d orthogonal eigenstates of X .
Specifically, the X-basis consists of
|j〉′ =
∑
l∈Fd
ωjl|l〉, j ∈ Fd.
BB84 protocol
(i) The sender, Alice, and the receiver, Bob, do Steps (ii)–(iv) for each i = 1, . . . , m.
(ii) Alice chooses a random bit ai. She prepares her system in one state that is chosen
uniformly randomly from the Z-basis if ai is 0, or in one from the X-basis if ai is 1.
(iii) Alice sends the prepared state to Bob.
(iv) Bob chooses another random bit bi, and receives the state, performs the Z-basis
measurement if bi is 0, or X-basis measurement if bi is 1.
(v) Alice and Bob announce a = (a1, . . . , am) and b = (b1, . . . , bm), respectively.
(vi) Alice and Bob discards any results where ai 6= bi. Alice draws another string of
random bits c = (c1, . . . , cm), and sends it to Bob through a public channel. They
decide that those d-ary digits with the accompanying ci being 0 will be the code
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digits, i.e., will be used for key transmission with a CSS code. In the case where
d = 2, it is assumed that the number of the code digits is even (if not, they divert
one digit chosen in an arbitrary manner to estimation of the noise level in the
following step).
(vii) Alice and Bob announce the values of their non-code digits which are accompanied
by ci = 1, and from these and ai (= bi), estimate the noise level, and decide on a
secure transmission rate, and a CSS code, i.e., a pair (C,Γ), to be used (the exact
meaning will be clear in Section 6).
(viii) Alice announces the coset y+C⊥, where y (= w+ v+ x) is the string consisting of
the remaining code digits. In other words, she announces the coset representative
x ∈ Fnd/C⊥ of the coset y + C⊥, or equivalently, the syndrome (y · gj)j=κj=1 .
(ix) Bob subtracts the coset representative x ∈ Fnd/C⊥ from his code digits, y − e, and
corrects the result y−x− e to a codeword u in C⊥, where he uses the decoder such
that u = y − x if e ∈ Γ.
(x) Alice uses the coset (y − x) + C ∈ C⊥/C and Bob uses u+ C ∈ C⊥/C as the key.
In Step (viii), x ∈ Fnd/C⊥ means that x is chosen from the transversal of Fnd/C⊥
shared by Alice and Bob, which may be assumed to be Γ. In short, by the law
of large numbers, about [(1 − pa)pb + pa(1 − pb)]m copies of states are discarded,
about (1 − pc)[(1 − pa)(1 − pb) + papb]m copies are used for transmission of the key
with CSS codes, the reliability of which was evaluated in Section 3, and the about
pc[(1− pa)(1− pb) + papb]m remaining copies are used for estimation of the noise level,
which will be explicated in Section 5.
In what follows, we will analyze the security of the protocol under the ‘individual
attack’ assumption that Eve obtains data by an identical measurement on each
particle. Especially, this assumption includes that Eve cannot change her measurement
according to the value of ai or bi. A measurement is modeled as a completely positive
(CP) instrument whose measurement result belongs to a finite or countable set (e.g.,
[12, 13, 14, 15, 16]). We also assume that the channel noises N ,N ′ are tensor products of
identical copies of a CP map. Namely, we assume a state ρ ∈ L(H) of each particle suffers
a change ρ 7→∑iAiρA†i , and Eve obtains i, or part of it, with probability TrA†iAiρ as
information on this particle.
We remark that some quantities such as Z = z and the quantum code (Qxz,R) are
artifices that have been introduced only to establish the security, and are not needed for
practice. For example, in the protocol, only half of the decoding operation R (the part
where a half of the syndrome, viz., (x · gi)κi=1 in (6) matters) is performed. This can be
viewed as the decoding for the classical code C⊥ (more precisely, the coset code y+C⊥),
and the decoding error probability of this classical code C⊥, together with 1 − EFXZ
for the corresponding CSS code CSS(C,Γ), has been upper-bounded exponentially in
Theorem 1.
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5. Estimation of Channel Parameters
Roughly speaking, the BB84 protocol consists of CSS coding and estimation of channel
parameters. This section explicates how the estimation works in the present case of
individual attacks.
Since Alice and Bob use the X-basis or Z-basis at random, the change suffered by
a transmitted state, if it is assumed to be a Z-basis element |j〉 initially, is either A or
A′ = U−1AU accordingly as the Z-basis (ai = bi = 0) or the X-basis (ai = bi = 1) is
used, where A represents Eve’s action plus the channel noises for each digit sent, and
U denotes the Fourier transform
U(ρ) = UρU †
with
U = d−1/2
∑
j,l∈Fd
ωjl|j〉〈l|.
Note that the X-basis {|j〉′} and Z-basis {|j〉} are related by
|j〉′ = U |j〉, j ∈ Fd.
We use the following well-known one-to-one map of Choi [42] between the CP maps
on L(H⊗n) and the positive semi-definite operators in L(H⊗n ⊗ H⊗n):
Mn(V) = [I ⊗ V](|Ψ〉〈Ψ|), (25)
where I is the identity map on L(H⊗n), and |Ψ〉 is a maximally entangled state given
by
|Ψ〉 = 1√
dn
∑
l∈B
|l〉 ⊗ |l〉
with some orthonormal basis B = {|l〉} of H⊗n. Choi introduced dnMn(V) in matrix
form to yield fundamentals of CP maps.
In the present case, we assume |l〉 = |l1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ln〉, l = (l1, . . . , ln) ∈ Fnd , and let
|Ψy〉 = 1√
dn
∑
l∈Fnd
|l〉 ⊗Ny|l〉, y ∈ X n. (26)
These 2n vectors form an orthonormal basis of H⊗n ⊗ H⊗n (e.g., [43]). Recall that
a symplectic code has a collection of subspaces {Qξ} and recovery operators Rξ for
each ξ, where ξ corresponds to the syndrome and has been written as xz for CSS
codes. It is known that an NJ -correcting symplectic code (Qξ,Rξ), used on a channel
Vn : L(H⊗n) → L(H⊗n), has entanglement fidelity, averaged over all ξ with equal
probabilities, not smaller than
∑
y∈J PVn(y):
EξFe(piQξ ,RξVn) ≥
∑
y∈J
PVn(y), (27)
where PVn(x) is associated with the channel Vn via
PVn(x) = 〈Ψx|Mn(Vn)|Ψx〉, x ∈ X n, (28)
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and Eξ is the expectation operator. This bound is implicit in [7] as explained in
Appendix A; the bound is tight for the largest choice of J [27].
Our channel to be analyzed has the product form Vn = Mn, and hence PVn also
has the product form
PVn = P
n
M.
Here, we have assumed Alice and Bob do not use the values of ai (= bi) for coding,
which implies that M can be regarded as the mixture
M = (1− r)A+ rA′.
Note, especially in the case where d = 2, PA and PA′ are related by
PA′(s, t) = PA(t, s), s, t ∈ Fd, (29)
since X and Z switches with each other by U . More generally, we have
PA′(s, t) = PA(t,−s), s, t ∈ Fd, (30)
which is proved in Appendix A.
The quantity PA(s, t) is the probability to obtain (s, t) with a measurement
{|Ψ(s,t)〉〈Ψ(s,t)|}(s,t)∈F2d on the system in the state M1(A). However, this seems hard
to implement, so that we divide the problem. We measure either s or t per sample of
the state M1(A). To do this, note that
Z ⊗ Z−1|Ψ(s,t)〉 = ωs|Ψ(s,t)〉 (31)
for (s, t) ∈ F2d. This implies that measuring eigenvalues of Z ⊗ Z−1, i.e., performing
the measurement {∑t∈Fd |Ψ(s,t)〉〈Ψ(s,t)|}s∈Fd in the state M1(A) gives the result s with
probability PA(s). Measuring eigenvalues of Z ⊗ Z−1 is still imaginary, but measuring
eigenvalues of Z ⊗ I and then I ⊗ Z−1 is completely simulated by sending one of the
eigenstates of Z at random (according to the uniform distribution) through A and
measuring Z−1 at the receiver’s end, and PA(s) equals the probability that the difference
l − l′ between the sent digit l and the received one l′ is s. For a natural estimate of
PA(s) needed in the BB84 protocol, we use the relative frequency of the appearances of
s ∈ Fd in the sequence of the observed differences li− l′i. In words, we use the type PU of
U for the estimate of PA, where the random variable U is the sequence of the differences
li− l′i and we use only the digits li and l′i accompanied by (ai, bi, ci) = (0, 0, 1). Noticing
(30), we use the similar estimates, say, PW, for PA, which is obtained from the sequence
W of the differences l′i − li of those li and l′i accompanied by (ai, bi, ci) = (1, 1, 1).
6. Security of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 Protocol
In this section, finally, we will establish the security of the BB84 protocol for high
rates using Theorem 1. This should be done in terms of the random variables involved
with the protocol, namely, Alice’s sent digits ηA = (ηA1 , . . . ,η
A
m), Bob’s received digits
ηB = (ηB1 , . . . ,η
B
m), C,X,V, a, b, c,E, and T defined below.
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In the BB84 protocol, we should consider the possibility of Eve’s obtaining
knowledges on the key from the data sent through the public channel, i.e., X, C, a, b and
c and the non-code digits used for the noise estimation (in our scheme, Γ is determined
from C, so that it need not be sent). For the purpose of analysis, we convert (a, b) into
(a, d = b − a), where we regard a, b and d = (d1, . . . , dm) as vectors over F2. Let a′
denote the subsequence aT of a (Appendix D), where T = {i | ci = 0 and di = 0}, the
set of the positions of the code digits (with the one element thrown away if d = 2 and
n = |T| is initially odd); let a′′ denote the subsequence aTc where Tc = {1, . . . , m} \ T;
we let YA [YB] denote the string of publicly announced non-code (estimation) digits
of Alice [Bob], which is a subsequence of ηA [ηB]. Denote the 7-tuple of random
variables (C, a′′, d, c,T,YA,YB) by S. One criterion for security that takes S into account
is I(V;EXa′|S = s) ≈ 0 for (almost) every definite value of S = s. The rationale hereof
is that we should evaluate the security for any definite values of as many parameters
as possible. To show that our scheme fulfills this criterion, we modify the argument in
Section 4.1 as follows.
The argument in Section 4.1 is applicable to the above protocol if we add the
conditioning on a′ and S to the mutual informations I. Specifically, we begin with
I(V;E|X = x,Z = z, a′ = a′, S = s) ≤ Sxz,a′,s instead of (19). Note that what we have
evaluated above is the fidelity EXZa′FXZ,a′,s (and the decoding error probability for key
transmission) of the codes used on the channel M⊗n, where Sxz,a′,s and Fxz,a′,s are the
obvious replacements for Sxz and Fxz with conditioning on a
′ = a′ and S = s, and EY
denotes the expectation operator with respect to a random variable Y. Then, in this
case, we can replace (22) with
I(V;E|XZa′, S = s) ≤ 2d−nE+o(n)[n(E +R)− o(n)] (32)
using the bound 1 − EFXZa′,s ≤ d−nE(R,P ,P )+o(n) in Theorem 1. From the chain rule of
mutual information [17, 23], we have
I(V;EXZa′|S = s)
= I(V;XZa′|S = s) + I(V;E|XZa′, S = s),
where I(V;XZa′|S = s) = 0 due to the mutual independence of V from X,Z, a′ given
S = s, and hence, I(V;EXa′|S = s) ≤ I(V;EXZa′|S = s) = I(V;E|XZa′, S = s).
Combining this with (32), we obtain
I(V;EXa′|S = s) ≤ 2d−nE+o(n)[n(E +R)− o(n)]. (33)
Note that n is also a random variable, which is a function of m and S = s.
Now it is time to clarify the meaning of what is stated in Step (vii) of the BB84
protocol in Section 4. Recall our assumption pa, pb, pc ∈ (0, 1) and (24), which imply
0 < r < 1,
as well as that the channel M = (1− r)A+ rA′ stands for Eve’s action, which implies
PM = (1−r)PA+rPA
f
and PM = (1−r)PA+rPA, where the operation f on probability
distributions is defined by
qf(t) = q(−t), t ∈ Fd.
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Let Alice and Bob choose a moderate number E > 0 as a wanted speed of
convergence of the amount of the possible information leakage I(V;EXa′|S = s) as well as
a sufficiently small positive constant ε. They use the estimate PU of PA and the estimate
PW of PA in Section 5. Let G consists of triples (α, p, q), where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and p, q are
distributions on Fd. With a triple (α, p, q) ∈ G, we associate a probability distribution
on {0, 1} × Fd, which we denote by Qα,p,q and specify by Qα,p,q(0, x) = (1− α)p(x) and
Qα,p,q(1, x) = αq(x), x ∈ Fd. Let λm [λ′m] denotes the number of samples used for the
estimation of PA [PA], and put ν = λm + λ
′
m.
In Step (vii), they choose a rate R such that E(R, (1−α)p+αqf, (1−α)q+αp) ≥ E
for any triple (α, p, q) ∈ G such that ‖Qα,p,q − Qλ′m/ν,PU,PW‖1 ≤ ε, and a code of rate R
and fidelity not smaller than 1 − d−nE(R,PL,PL)+o(n) for any channel L, the existence of
which is ensured by Theorem 1. [The function o(n) is explicitly given in Remark 4 to
Theorem 1.]
For simplicity, we restrict our attention to the almost sure event where ν/m →
[(1 − pa)(1 − pb) + papb]pc > 0 as m → ∞, which directly follows from the strong
law of large numbers applied to (di, ci), i = 1, 2, . . . (e.g., [44]). For any m, if
‖Q
r,PA,PA
− Qλ′m/ν,PU,PW‖1 ≤ ε, then E(R,PM, PM) ≥ E as desired. Owing to (12),
the probability (conditioned on specific values of d, c) of the event of estimation failure
where ‖Q
r,PA,PA
−Qλ′m/ν,PU,PW‖1 > ε is upper-bounded by
d
−νmin
Q:‖Q−Q
r,PA,PA
‖
1
≥ε
D(Q||Q
r,PA,PA
)+o(m)
, (34)
and this goes to zero with probability one in our almost sure event.
Hence, the above version of the BB84 protocol is secure in the sense that with Eve’s
attack modeled as a tensor product form of identical copies of a CP instrument, for any
such instrument, either ‘the mutual information between the key and the eavesdropper’s
obtained data, together with the decoding error probability for the key transmission, is
upper-bounded by d−nE+o(n), where E is positive’ or ‘the probability that the detection
of eavesdroppers fails is exponentially close to zero’. Especially, reliable and secure key
transmission is possible with this protocol at any rate below
(1− pc)(1− pa − pb + 2papb)
· [1− 2max{H((1− r)PA + rPA
f
), H((1− r)PA + rPA)})], (35)
where the rate indicates the ratio of the length of the key to the number of uses of the
channel, rather than to the code length of the incorporated CSS code.
7. Discussions
The achievability of the rate [1− 2h(δX + δZ)]/4, where δX = PA(1), δZ = PA(1) ≤ 1/2
may be implicit in [6] though their error rates may differ from our δX and δZ . This
bound can be understood to be obtained by using the exponent EGV(R,PM) =
min
1−2h(Q(1)+Q(1))≤R or Q(1)+Q(1)≥1
D(Q||PM) in place of E(R,PM, PM) of Theorem 1.
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Specifically, this follows from the Gilbert-Varshamov bound for CSS codes [10] and
Sanov’s theorem in large deviation theory (e.g., [22, 23]) or (12). [For the present
purpose, we need only the upper bound on the probability in question, so that the half
of Sanov’s theorem, viz., (12), is enough.] Shor and Preskill [6] also mentioned a higher
rate, which corresponds to [1−2h((δX + δZ)/2)]/4, i.e., (35) with pa = pb = pc = 1/2 or
[1− 2H(PM)]/4 (d = 2). (36)
This rate is established by Theorem 1 (Section 3) rigorously. Another achievable rate is
presented in Appendix B. Several other achievable rates (or tolerable error rates) have
been mentioned in the literature (e.g., [7, Eq. (38)], [45, 46]) without details on their
code structures.
8. Conclusion
In summary, we have established achievable rates in the BB84 protocol. This improves
the one based on the Gilbert-Varshamov bound for CSS codes, which may be implicit
in Shor and Preskill’s security proof. Specifically, in this paper proved was the
existence of a version of the BB84 protocol with exponential convergence of the mutual
information between Alice and Eve to zero for any rate below the number in (35).
Several issues lacking in the literature were pointed out and resolved (cf. criticisms
of Yuen [48, Appendix A] on other security proofs). Namely, the existence of CSS
codes robust against fluctuations of channel parameters was proved, and the decoding
error probability for key transmission, together with the mutual information, was shown
to decrease exponentially. Especially, it was proved that codes of ‘balanced’ weight
spectra (Corollary 2) achieve the coding rate 1 − 2h((δX + δZ)/2) for d = 2, where
δX = PA(1), δZ = PA(1). A proof of the security of a BB84-type protocol for joint
attacks is given in Appendix C.
In a seemingly less practical but theoretically interesting setting where Eve’s attack
is known to Alice and Bob beforehand, the optimum rate has recently been obtained in
[49].
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Appendix A. Proofs of Subsidiary Results
A1. Proof of the fidelity bound (27)
The bound directly follows from the argument in the two paragraphs containing
Eqs. (18)–(24) of [7, Section III-B] for d = 2. The entanglement distillation protocol
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they used is the same as Shor and Preskill’s [6] and can be interpreted as follows
for our purposes. Given a bipartite state Mn(Vn) = [I ⊗ Vn](|Ψ〉〈Ψ|), where |Ψ〉 =
d−n/2
∑
ξ,y |ξ, y〉 ⊗ |ξ, y〉, where {|ξ, y〉}y is an orthonormal basis of Qξ. Alice performs
the local measurement {Πξ} on the first half of the system, where Πξ denotes the
projection onto the code space Qξ, and Bob performs the recovery operation for the
NJ -correcting code Qξ knowing that Alice’s measurement result is ξ. Since Alice obtains
each result ξ with the equal probability, the lower bound of [7] serves as that on the
average entanglement fidelity of the code (Qξ,Rξ) in question.
The bound (27) for d ≥ 2, together with its tightness, follows from the formula
for ‘discrete twirling’ ([50] and references therein) and the properties of the symplectic
codes [27]. It is remarked that a similar bound was given by the present author [25,
Lemma 5]; we can rephrase this bound in terms of the entanglement fidelity Fe using
the relation
K(K + 1)−1[1− Fe(K−1I,A)] = 1− Eϕ〈ϕ|A(|ϕ〉〈ϕ|)|ϕ〉,
where A is a CP map on L(H) with dimH = K, and Eϕ denotes the expectation
operator with ϕ = |ϕ〉 regarded as uniformly distributed over all unit vectors in H [51],
though the resulting bound has the form 1− F ′e ≤ (K + 1)K−1
∑
y∈Jc PVn(y), which is
weaker than (27) by the asymptotically negligible factor of (K + 1)K−1.
A2. Proof of (30)
First, observe, by the definition of M1 in (25) and that of |Ψy〉 in (26), that PA(s, t) can
be written as
PA(s, t) =
∑
i
∣∣∣d−1TrA†iXsZt∣∣∣2 , s, t ∈ Fd
for a CP map A(σ) =∑iAiσA†i . Then, for A′ = U−1AU , we have
PA′(s, t) =
∑
i
∣∣d−1Tr(U †AiU)†XsZt∣∣2
=
∑
i
∣∣∣d−1TrA†iUXsU †UZtU †∣∣∣2
=
∑
i
∣∣∣d−1TrA†iZ−sX t∣∣∣2
where we used the relations UXU † = Z−1 and UZU † = X for the last equality. Since
Z−sX t is the same as X tZ−s up to a phase factor, ωst, by the commutation relation
XZ = ωZX or (3), we have PA′(s, t) = PA(t,−s), as promised.
A3. Proof That P
n
(Γ′cn) Is the Decoding Error Probability for Key Transmission
The probability in question has the form [p1 · · ·pn](T ), where pi are probability
distributions on Fd and T ⊆ Fnd [in the present case, pi are identically equal to
P ], while the ith transmitted digit suffers the probabilistic change described by a
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channel matrix, say, Qi(yi|xi) with pi(zi) = d−1
∑
xi∈Fd
Qi(xi − zi|xi) as already argued
in Section 5. Putting qi(zi|xi) = Qi(xi − zi|xi), [q1 . . . qn](z1, . . . , zn|x1, . . . , xn) =
q1(z1|x1) · · · qn(zn|xn), and recalling the decoding procedure in Steps (viii)–(x) of the
protocol, we see the decoding error probability is given by d−n
∑
x∈Fnd
[q1 · · · qn](T |x) =
[p1 · · · pn](T ), as desired.
Appendix B. Minimum Conditional Entropy Decoding
In this appendix, a decoding strategy for CSS codes in the BB84 protocol that results
in an improvement on the achievable rate, especially when r = 1/2, is proposed.
Define µm and µ
′
m by µm = |{i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m, (ai, bi, ci) = (0, 0, 0)}| and
µ′m = |{i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m, (ai, bi, ci) = (1, 1, 0)}|, where m is the number of the whole
sent digits. In the proposed scheme, Alice and Bob use min{µm, µ′m} digits with
(ai, bi, ci) = (0, 0, 0) and the same number of digits with (ai, bi, ci) = (1, 1, 0) for CSS
coding discarding excessive digits if they exist. If r = 1/2, the loss of digits in this
process is small by the strong law of large numbers.
In the conventional decoding schemes for CSS codes in the BB84 protocol [6, 7, 8]
or that in Section 6, Bob does not use the information as to whether ai = bi = 0 or
ai = bi = 1 has occurred; he considers the channel as the mixture of A and A′ = U−1AU .
To improve on the achievable rates in (35) for r = 1/2, we employ a decoding strategy
that uses the information on ai (= bi), minimum conditional entropy decoding, so to
speak. Specifically, we associate each word xx′, where xx′ denotes the concatenation of
x ∈ Fνd and x′ ∈ Fνd, and x [x′] is composed of the digits for which ai = 0 [ai = 1], with
the conditional entropy
hc(x, x
′) =
H(Px) +H(Px′)
2
, (B.1)
and choose a word that minimizes the conditional entropy hc in each coset in F
n
d/C
⊥ to
obtain a transversal Γ. The quantity hc(x, x
′) can be written solely with Px and Px′, so
that we will occasionally denote hc(x, x
′) by hc(Px,Px′).
Theorem 2 Let a number 0 ≤ R ≤ 1 be given. There exists a sequence of pairs
{(Cν ,Γν)}ν∈N, each consisting of a self-orthogonal code Cν ⊆ F2νd with 2ν − 2 dimCν ≥
2νR and a set Γν of coset representatives of F
2ν
d /C
⊥
ν such that for any pair of probability
distributions P0 and P1 on X ,
P ν0 P
ν
1 (J(Γ
′
ν)
c) ≤ P0νP1ν(Γ′cν ) + P0
ν
P1
ν
(Γ′cν ) ≤ d−2νEc(R,P0,P1)+o(ν),
where
Γ′ν = Γν + Cν ,
Ec(R,P0, P1) = min{E∗(R,P0, P1), E∗(R,P0, P1)},
E∗(R, p0, p1) = min
Q0,Q1
[D(Q0||p0) +D(Q1||p1)
+ |1− 2hc(Q0, Q1)− R|+]/2,
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and the minimization with respect to (Q0, Q1) is taken over all pairs of probability
distributions on Fd.
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1. In this case, we pair up digits in a sequence
xy = (x1, . . . , xν , y1, . . . , yν) as (x1, y1), . . . , (xν , yν) to regard it as a sequence from X ν ,
X = Fd × Fd. Then, to evaluate the fidelity of the codes, we use the existence proof of
‘balanced’ codes in Section 3, which is clearly valid if we use types in Pν(X ) in place of
types in Pn(Fd), and the similarly modified permutation argument for sequences in X ν .
By this theorem with P0 = PA and P1 = PU−1AU , the rate (1− pc)[1−H(A)−H(A)]/2
is achievable with the BB84 protocol. The result extends to an arbitrary rational r; for
example, for r = 1/3, we can use types in Pν(F3d).
Appendix C. Security against Joint Attacks
In this appendix, we will prove the security of the following modified BB84 protocol
against any joint attack through this paper’s approach. Especially, an exponential
upper bound on the information leakage to Eve, which holds for finite m and n, will be
established. This modification to the protocol is essentially due to [46], and its main idea
is as follows. In the protocol, about papbm digits with ai = bi = 1 are used for estimation
of the level of errors caused by the Weyl unitary Z, the same number of randomly chosen
digits with ai = bi = 0 are used for estimation of those caused by X , and the about
[(1− pa)(1− pb)− papb]m remaining digits with ai = bi = 0 are used for CSS coding. In
this paper, we assume that the parameters pa = Pr{ai = 1}, pb = Pr{bi = 1} ∈ (0, 1/2)
are independent of m in order that the law of large numbers (or any other refined law
such as Sanov’s theorem) is applicable to {(ai, bi)}; in [46], it is assumed pa, pb depend
on m so that r in (24) goes to 0 as m goes to infinity (seemingly only for the purpose
of analysis of security); Hayashi [52] described an idea for a possible proof of security
of this protocol using the codes in Theorem 1 (in fact, the modification for d = 2 in
Section 3.2) for small enough r.
Let Sn be the symmetric group on {1, . . . , n} as before. For the proof for joint
attacks, we should be more specific about the expression of the key. Given a self-
orthogonal code C, the key, which is actually a string of k = n − 2κ digits, is encoded
into C⊥/C. The encoding map, fC,h1,...,hk , can be given as fC,h1,...,hk : (σ1, . . . , σk) 7→
C + σ1h1 + . . . + σkhk, where {h1, . . . , hk}, together with a basis of C, gives a basis of
C⊥. Thus, Alice and Bob specify their cryptographic code by (g1, . . . , gκ; h1, . . . , hk; Γ);
in this appendix, we always assume g1, . . . , gκ form a basis of C. We use the syndromes
X′,Z′ ∈ Fκd for the code C⊥ and the coset representatives X,Z for Fnd/C⊥ interchangeably
since they are in one-to-one correspondence with each other once the generator g1, . . . , gκ
of C is fixed: XHT = X′, where HT = [gT1 · · · gTκ ]. In places where we want to distinguish
a random variable from its realization, we use the sanserif or bold font for the former
and the italic font for the latter as in the text.
Modified BB84 protocol
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(i) The sender, Alice, and the receiver, Bob, do Steps (ii)–(iv) for each i = 1, . . . , m.
(ii) Alice chooses a random bit ai. She prepares her system in one state that is chosen
uniformly randomly from the Z-basis if ai is 0, or in one from the X-basis if ai is 1.
(iii) Alice sends the prepared state to Bob.
(iv) Bob chooses another random bit bi, and receives the state, performs the Z-basis
measurement if bi is 0, or X-basis measurement if bi is 1.
(v) Alice and Bob announce a = (a1, . . . , am) and b = (b1, . . . , bm), respectively.
(vi) Alice and Bob discards any results where ai 6= bi. Let Tsift = {i | ai = bi} (the
remaining places) and µ = |Tsift|. [In the case where d = 2, it is assumed that µ
is even; if not, they disregard another place chosen randomly from {i | ai = bi}.]
Put n
def
= µ − 2|{i | ai = bi = 1}|. If n ≤ 0 or n = µ, they abort the protocol. To
divide Tsift = {i | ai = bi} into two parts, i.e., that for CSS coding T, and that for
estimation for the noise level Tsift\T, they do the following. From {i | ai = bi = 0},
Alice randomly chooses (according to the uniform distribution over all possible
choices) (µ − n)/2 = |{i | ai = bi = 1}| places where digits are to be used for
estimation of the level of errors caused by the Weyl unitary X , and tells the choice
to Bob. The set of the remaining n places with ai = bi = 0 constitute T. The digits
with ai = bi = 1 will also be used for noise estimation.
(vii) Alice and Bob announce the values of their estimation digits thus chosen (which
will be YA and YB below) and from these, estimate the noise level, and decide on a
secure transmission rate, and a CSS code (g1, . . . , gκ; h1, . . . , hk; Γ) to be used.
(viii) Alice chooses a random permutation pi from Sn according to the uniform
distribution, and tells the choice to Bob.
(ix) Alice announces the coset y+pi(C⊥), where y (= w+ v+x) is the string consisting
of the remaining code digits. In other words, she announces the syndrome X′ =
(y · pi(gj))j=κj=1 , which is in one-to-one correspondence with the coset representative
x ∈ Fnd/pi(C⊥) of the coset y + pi(C⊥).
(x) Bob subtracts the coset representative x ∈ Fnd/pi(C⊥) from his code digits, y − e,
and corrects the result y − x − e to a codeword u in pi(C)⊥, where he uses the
decoder such that u = y − x if e ∈ pi(Γ).
(xi) Alice uses σ = f−1pi(C),pi(h1),...,pi(hk)[y−x+pi(C)] and Bob uses σ′ = f−1pi(C),pi(h1),...,pi(hk)[u+
pi(C)] as the key.
Let a TPCP map A : L(H⊗m) → L(H⊗m) represents the whole action of Eve (plus
the other environment). This means that there exists a decomposition (CP instrument)
{Ai}i such that A =
∑
iAi, where Ai are trace-nonincreasing CP maps, and when the
initial state of the system of the whole sent digits is ρ, Eve obtains data E = i with
probability TrAi(ρ) leaving the system in state Ai(ρ)/TrAi(ρ). Here, the decomposition
may depend on the other random variables available to Eve. However, the proof relies
on the assumption that A does not depend on a, b, which is needed to use Lemma 5
below. Recalling the interpretation of the Z ⊗Z−1 measurement in Section 5 and using
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the U ⊗ U -invariance of |Ψ〉, where U = d−1/2∑j,l∈Fd ωjl|j〉〈l| and U = U−1, and the
relation X ⊗X|Ψ(s,t)〉 = ωt|Ψ(s,t)〉 in addition to (31), we notice that Alice’s sent digits
ηA = (ηA1 , . . . ,η
A
m) and Bob’s received digits η
B = (ηB1 , . . . ,η
B
m) are mathematically
equivalent to the results of the following fictional measurements. We imagine that Alice
and Bob have a bipartite system in state Mm(A), and observe O(i)ai , i = 1, . . . , m, and
O
(i)
bi
, i = 1, . . . , m, respectively, where O
(i)
ai = I
⊗(i−1) ⊗ Oai ⊗ I⊗(m−i) ∈ L(H⊗m). Here,
O0 is the ‘observable’ Z to distinguish the eigenvalues of Z (more precisely, the Z-basis
measurement {|i〉〈i|}d−1i=0 ), and O1 denotes X , i.e, {|i〉′〈i|′}d−1i=0 . Then, ηA and ηB are the
same as the sequence of the measurement results of Alice and that of Bob, respectively,
for d = 2 (and this is true if each digit t ∈ Fd of ηA with ai = 1 is replaced by
−t for d > 2). Moreover, we can relate ηA and ηB to the classical random variables
(ξi, ζi), i = 1, . . . , m, which are drawn according to PA defined by (28) as follows. We
have ξT0 = η
A
T0
− ηB
T0
for the subsequence ξT0 of ξ = ξ1 · · · ξm (Appendix D), where
T0 = {i | ai = bi = 0}, and ζT1 = ηBT1 − ηAT1 , where T1 = {i | ai = bi = 1}.
In what follows, we evaluate the fidelity, F(Tsift,µ,n) defined below, of the
symplectic code underlying the protocol, which is, in essence, the CSS code
(g1, . . . , gκ; h1, . . . , hk; Γ). As before, the fidelity can be written in terms of the classical
random variables ξ, ζ. [In fact, the underlying code is the combined system of this
CSS code CSS(C,Γ) and a trivial symplectic code, which conveys no information
(i.e., protects only a one-dimensional subspace of H⊗(m−n)), where each code does
its job independently. The trivial code is the collection of simultaneous eigenspaces
of {O(i)′ai | i ∈ {1, . . . , m} \ T}, where O(i)
′
ai ∈ L(H⊗(m−n)) is obtained from O(i)ai =
I⊗(i−1)⊗Oai ⊗ I⊗(m−i) ∈ L(H⊗m) by neglecting I’s on the systems for T. The combined
code is an N
J(Γ)×F
2(m−n)
d
-correcting symplectic code. Here, the appropriate permutation
on {1, . . . , m} is to be understood.]
Let YA [YB] denote the string of publicly announced estimation digits of Alice
[Bob], which is a subsequence of ηA [ηB]; assume, say, the first half of YA [YB] consists
of the digits accompanied by ai = bi = 0 and the latter half is for ai = bi = 1. Recall
T ⊆ {1, . . . , m} denotes the set of the positions of the code digits. Eve can have access
to a, b, X′, S′ = (Tsift,µ, n), YA,YB, T, k, C
′ = (g1, . . . , gκ; h1, . . . , hk; Γ) and pi. In what
follows, with m > 0 and the realization S′ = (Tsift, µ, n) arbitrarily fixed, we will upper-
bound I(σ;EX′YAYBpiTabC
′|k, S′ = (Tsift, µ, n)) and the probability of key disagreement
Pr{σ 6= σ′|S′ = (Tsift, µ, n)} simultaneously.
In step (vii), Alice and Bob choose the code in the following manner. With a
sufficiently small constant γ > 0 chosen beforehand, they set
R(n, µ,YA,YB) = 1− 2max{H(Pξest), H(Pζest)} − 2γ, (C.1)
where ξest and ζest represent the first half of YA − YB and the second half of
YB − YA, respectively, calculate the minimum k of the possible code size k′ with
k′/n ≥ R(n, µ, YA, YB), set k = k, and choose a code (g1, . . . , gκ; h1, . . . , hk; Γ) from
the shared list of codes satisfying the property of Corollary 2. Note that ξest = ξT′ ,
where T′ ⊆ {i | ai = bi = 0} stands for the places for the estimation, and ζest = ζT1
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with T1 = {i | ai = bi = 1}.
Let Fk,(Tsift,µ,n) be |Sn|−1
∑
pi∈Sn
P
[ξcode,ζcode]|k=k,S′=(Tsift,µ,n)
{J [pi(Γ + C)]}, where
ξcode = ξT and ζcode = ζT. Then,
1− Fk,(Tsift,µ,n) ≤ B(Pξcode|k=k,S′=(Tsift,µ,n)) +B(Pζcode|k=k,S′=(Tsift,µ,n)), (C.2)
where B(Q) = |Sn|−1
∑
pi∈Sn
Q[pi(Γ + C)c]. The part bounding B(p) in Section 3
(the last paragraph in Section 3.1), as well as its modification for d = 2 in
Section 3.2, applies verbatim to the present case, where we want to upper-bound
B(PG|k=k,S′=(Tsift,M,n)) for G = ξcode, ζcode, if we replace p
n, B(p) in (16) and
d−nD(p||Q) in (18) by PG|k=k,S′=(Tsift,µ,n),(YA,YB)=(YA,YB), B(PG|k=k,S′=(Tsift,µ,n),(YA,YB)=(YA,YB))
and PG|k=k,S′=(Tsift,µ,n),(YA,YB)=(YA,YB)(T nQ ), respectively. Thus, we have
B(Pξcode|k=k,S′=(Tsift,µ,n),(YA,YB)=(YA,YB)
)
≤ |Pn|
∑
Q∈Pn
Pξcode|k=k,S′=(Tsift,µ,n),(YA,YB)=(YA,YB)
(T nQ )
·min{
∑
Q′:H(Q′)≤H(Q)
dnH(Q
′)−n−k
2
−1, 1}
≤ dd|Pn|2
∑
Q∈Pn
Pr{Pξcode = Q|k = k, S
′ = (Tsift, µ, n), (YA,YB) = (YA, YB)}
· d−n|1−R(n,µ,YA,YB)−2H(Q)|+/2
for any k and (YA, YB) with Pr{k = k, (YA,YB) = (YA, YB)|S′ = (Tsift, µ, n)} > 0, as
well as the counterpart for ζcode. Substituting (C.1) into these estimates, applying
the operation A 7→ ∑(YA,YB),k Pr{(YA,YB) = (YA, YB), k = k|S′ = (Tsift, µ, n)}A, and
combining them with (C.2), we have the following bound on F(Tsift,µ,n) =
∑n
k=0 Pr{k =
k|S′ = (Tsift, µ, n)}Fk,(Tsift,µ,n):
1− F(Tsift,µ,n)
≤ dd|Pn|2
∑
Q∈Pn,Q′∈P(µ−n)/2
Pr{Pξcode = Q and Pξest = Q
′|S′ = (Tsift, µ, n)}
· d−n[|H(Q′)−H(Q)+γ|+]
+ dd|Pn|2
∑
Q∈Pn,Q′∈P(µ−n)/2
Pr{Pζcode = Q and Pζest = Q
′|S′ = (Tsift, µ, n)}
· d−n[|H(Q′)−H(Q)+γ|+]
≤ 4dd|Pn|3|P(n+µ)/2|3d−nE1(γ,α), (C.3)
where α = (µ− n)/(µ+ n),
E1(γ, α) = min
0≤ε≤2
{(1− α)−1[g(α)ε]2/(2 ln d) + |γ − θ(ε)|+},
θ(x) =

0 for x = 0
−x logd(x/d) for 0 < x ≤ 1/2
1 for 1/2 < x,
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and
g(α) =
√
α(1− α)√
α +
√
1− α.
To see the last inequality in (C.3), we need the next lemma with Y = Fd and
N = (µ + n)/2 as well as the continuity of entropy, i.e., that ‖Q − Q′‖1 ≤ ε implies
|H(Q) − H(Q′)| ≤ θ(ε) [17]; we have upper-bounded each summation on the right-
hand side by
∑
ε 2|PN |2d−N [g(α)ε]
2/(2 ln d)d−n|γ−θ(ε)|
+
using the lemma, where ε ranges
over {ε | ∃Q ∈ Pn, Q′ ∈ P(µ−n)/2, ‖Q − Q′‖1 = ε}, which is not greater than
2|Pn||PN |3d−nE1(γ,α).
Lemma 5 (Random Sampling) Let a finite alphabet Y and positive integers n and
N , 0 < n < N , be given. Put α = (N − n)/N . Assume that Y is an arbitrary random
variable taking values in YN and we choose n symbols from Y uniformly randomly.
Denote the resulting string by Y′ (arranged in an arbitrary order, which does not matter)
and the string of the remaining digits by Y′′. Then the probability that ‖PY′ −PY′′‖1 ≥ ε
is upper-bounded by 2|PN(Y)|2d−N [g(α)ε]2/(2 ln d).
Proof . For a fixed realization y of Y, denote the conditional probability
Pr{PY′ = Q and PY′′ = Q′|Y = y} by W (Q,Q′|y) (W is a classical channel). For
now imagine that Y is the sequence of independent random variables identically
distributed according to Q ∈ PN (Y), and let (QN × W )[A], or the QN × W -
probability of A, denote the probability of the event A under this condition. The
QN × W -probability that ‖PY′ − PY‖1 ≥ ε′/
√
1− α or ‖PY′′ − PY‖1 ≥ ε′/
√
α is
upper-bounded by 2|PN(Y)|d−Nε′2/(2 lnd) by large deviation theory, i.e., by (12), and
Pinsker’s inequality D(Q||Q′) ≥ ‖Q − Q′‖21/(2 ln d) [17]. In words, the probability
that ‖PY′ − PY‖1 < ε′/
√
1− α and ‖PY′′ − PY‖1 < ε′/
√
α is lower-bounded by
1 − 2|PN(Y)|d−Nε′2/(2 lnd). By the triangle inequality, this immediately implies (QN ×
W )[‖PY′ − PY′′‖1 < (1/
√
α + 1/
√
1− α)ε′] ≥ 1 − 2|PN(Y)|d−Nε′2/(2 lnd). Note that
W (·, ·|y) is the same for all y ∈ YN of a fixed type, and hence, ∀Q′, Q′′, W (Q′, Q′′|y) ≤
(QN ×W )[PY′ = Q′ and PY′′ = Q′′]/QN(T NQ ), where Q = Py, for any y. Since for any
Q ∈ PN (Y), QN (T NQ ) ≥ |PN(Y)|−1 (in fact, maxP∈PN (Y)QN(T NP ) = QN(T NQ ) [17]),
we have Pr{‖PY′ − PY′′‖1 ≥ (1/
√
α + 1/
√
1− α)ε′|Y = y} ≤ 2|PN(Y)|2d−Nε′2/(2 lnd).
Noticing this bound is independent of y, we obtain the lemma. 
Remark. In the above application of this lemma, Y′ and Y′′ are the code digits
and estimation digits, respectively. This ensures that PY′ and PY′′ are close with
high probability. In the binary case where Y = {0, 1}, upper bounds of the form
exp{−(N −n)Kε2}, with some constant K, for the probability that Py(1)−PY′′(1) = ε
has been known for long [53] and most security proofs for QKD use this type of bounds
(e.g., [5, Appendix M, e-Print], [46, Lemma 1], [7, Eq. (25)], [54, Appendix, Property 16],
[55, p. 589, Exercise 12.27], [52]). An advantage of the above lemma is the applicability
to the case where |Y| > 2.
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The rest of the task is to relate the fidelity bound in (C.3) to the mutual information
as we did in Section 6 for individual attacks. In the present case, we initially have
I(σ;E|X′Z′YAYBpiTabC′k, S′ = (Tsift, µ, n))
≤ 2d−nE1(γ,α)+o1(n,µ)[n(E1(γ, α) + 1)− o1(n, µ)]
with a negligible function o1(n, µ). Note that σ is independent of X
′,Z′,YA,YB,pi,T, a, b
and C′ conditionally on k (i.e., S′′′ = (X′,Z′,YA,YB,pi,T, a, b,C
′), k and σ form a Markov
chain in this order [17]) given S′ = (Tsift, µ, n) since the probability of σ conditioned on
k = k, S′′′ = s′′′ and S′ = (Tsift, µ, n) is uniform over F
k
d. By the chain rule for mutual
information, again, this implies
I(σ;EX′YAYBpiTabC
′|k, S′ = (Tsift, µ, n)) ≤ d−nE1(γ,α)+o(m)
[cf. (33)], where o(m) can be explicitly given as 3 logd 2+d+6(d−1) logdm+logd[m(γ+
1)]. This simultaneously upper-bounds Pr{σ 6= σ′|S′ = (Tsift, µ, n)} since the argument
in Section A.3 also extends to the present case trivially. The bound is valid for m finite
and is also meaningful in the limit of m large since α goes to r in (24) almost surely
by the law of large numbers applied to the stochastic process {(ai, bi)}i. In fact, for
the almost sure event where α ∈ [r0, r1] for all large enough m, where r0 < r < r1, the
bound is true with E1(γ, α) replaced by
E2(γ, r0, r1) = min
0≤ε≤2
[Gε2/(2 ln d) + |γ − θ(ε)|+].
Here, G = minr0≤α≤r1(1 − α)−1[g(α)]2 can be made positive so that E2(γ, r0, r1) is
positive by choosing r0, r1 and γ appropriately.
This protocol achieves the rate (1 − pa − pb)[1 − 2max{H(PA), H(PA)}] for an
individual attack A, as can be checked by modifying the argument in Section 6 more
easily.
Appendix D. Nomenclature
Several symbols often used in this paper are listed below.
Strings, Probability Distributions and the Weyl Unitary Basis
• 0n = (0, . . . , 0) ∈ Fnd , 1n = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Fnd
• X = F2d = Fd × Fd
• [u, w] = ((u1, w1), . . . , (un, wn)) ∈ X n for u = (u1, . . . , un), w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Fnd
• N[u,w] = XuZw, where Xu = Xu1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Xun and Zw = Zw1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Zwn
• Py: type of string y, defined by (10)
• P(Y): the set of all probability distribution on Y
• Pn(Y): the set of all types of sequences in Yn [ Pn(Y) ⊆ P(Y) ]
• [PQ](x, y) = P (x)Q(y)
• Q(s) =∑t∈Y Q(s, t), Q(s) =∑t∈Y Q(t, s)
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• sT : subsequence sj1 · · · sjn of s1 · · · sm, where T = {j1 · · · , jn} ⊆ {1, . . . , m} and
j1 < · · · < jn.
Standard Notation in Information Theory
• Entropy: H(P ) = −∑y∈Y P (y) logd P (y)
• Kullback-Leibler information: D(P ||Q) =∑y∈Y P (y) logd P (y)Q(y)
• Mutual information: For random variables X and Y, I(X;Y) = D(PXY||PXPY),
where PW denotes the probability distribution ofW for an arbitrary discrete random
variable W; I(X;Y|Z = z) = D(PXY|Z=z||PX|Z=zPY|Z=z), where the probability that
W = w conditional on the event Z = z is denoted by PW|Z=z(w), and I(X;Y|Z)
stands for the expectation
∑
z PZ(z)I(X;Y|Z = z).
• h(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x), 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
CSS Codes
• Γ: transversal (set of coset representatives in which each coset has exactly one
representative) of Fnd/C
⊥
• CSS(C,Γ): NJ(Γ)-correcting CSS code made from a self-orthogonal C with basis
g1, . . . , gκ, where J(Γ) is given in (8)
• Letters v, x, z as coset representatives (after [6]):
v + C ∈ C⊥/C,
x+ C⊥ ∈ Fnd/C⊥, z + C⊥ ∈ Fnd/C⊥
Parameters in the BB84 protocol
• m: total number of d-ary digits transmitted in the BB84 protocol
• n: code-length of CSS code
• κ = dimFd C
• k = n− 2κ = logd dimCQxz (Qxz: quantum CSS codes)
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